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The significance of the Asian fertility transition can hardly be overestimated. The 
relatively  sanguine  view of population growth expressed at the 1994 International 
Conference for Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo was possible only 
because of the demographic events in Asia over the last 30 years. In 1965 Asian women 
were still bearing about six children. Even at current rates, today’s young women will 
give birth to half as many. This measure, namely the average number of live births over 
a reproductive lifetime, is called the total fertility rate. It has to be above 2—
considerably above if mortality is still high—to achieve long-term population 
replacement. By 1995 East Asia, taken as a whole, exhibited a total fertility rate of 1.9. 
Elsewhere, Singapore was below long-term replacement, Thailand had just achieved it, 
and Sri Lanka was only a  little above. 
The role of Asia in the global fertility transition  is shown by estimates I made a 
few years ago for a World Bank Planning Meeting covering the first quarter of a 
century of the Asian transition [Caldwell (1993), p. 300]. Between 1965 and 1988 the 
world’s annual birth rate fell by 22 percent.  In  1988  there would have been 40 
million more births if there had been no decline from 1965 fertility levels. Of that total 
decline in the world’s births, almost 80 percent had been contributed by Asia, compared 
with only 10 percent by Latin America, nothing by Africa, and, unexpectedly, 10 
percent by the high-income countries of the West. Indeed, 60 percent of the decline was 
produced by two countries, China and India, even though they constitute only 38 
percent of the world’s population. They accounted, between them, for over three-
quarters of Asia’s fall in births. 
From the end of the Second World War there was a growing movement which 
held that the quickening rate of population growth, resulting from unexpectedly steep 
mortality declines had to be constrained by a fall in fertility. If necessary, that fall had to 
be planned and assisted by governments. There were two problems. 
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The first was that no fertility decline—bar a modest one in Japan—had ever been 
recorded outside the West, and there was a growing body of literature which claimed 
that the Western experience was unique and arose from a type of family which was 
found nowhere else. The second problem was that no government had ever set up 
programmes to intervene in the field of reproduction and many Western observers 
believed that none were ever likely to do so. 
The second problem began to be overcome from 1951 when Prime Minister 
Nehru announced that India would establish a national family planning programme 
from the following year. Just how unforeseen this was is shown  by the paper published 
soon afterwards by Frank Notestein in Population Index [Notestein (1951)]. Notestein 
was the leader of the group that believed that fertility decline  had to be organised, but, 
with an experience largely confined to Western governments, he had not anticipated 
that such an action could be taken by the government of a large poor country where 
nearly all the population appeared to show by their behaviour that they believed in 
unrestricted fertility. 
Although Nehru made his announcement after having been startled by the 
unexpectedly large population recorded by the 1951 census, this decision rested on a 
longer history in undivided British colonial India. Both foreign and indigenous civil 
servants and other sections of the elite took it for granted that Malthus was at least 
partly right about South Asia and that there was a race between population and 
resources, especially food [Caldwell and Caldwell (1986)]. Nehru might not have come 
to his decision but for the memory of the horrific Bengal famine of 1943-44, which had 
been the subject of a recent report [Indian Famine Inquiry Commission (1945)]. The 
likely need for state intervention in the greater India area had been stated in the 
influential Bhore Report on health published in 1947 [Indian Government, Health 
Survey and Development Committee (1946)], a theme which was then taken up by the 
Congress Party’s planning committee’s sub-committee [Shah (1947)]. All took the non- 
Western view that there was no fundamental problem in governments intervening to 
influence their citizens’ fertility levels and reproductive habits, except that they might 
not succeed in reducing fertility. The other part of the old Indian territory, Pakistan, 
followed only four years later in announcing that it would also employ state 
intervention to attempt to reduce the rate of population growth. 
The other problem appeared more formidable, and perhaps insurmountable. By 
1965 there were a range of national family planning programmes  in the world, as well 
as private programmes with government backing [Berelson et al. (1966)], and yet Third 
World fertility remained almost uniformly high, while mortality declined and 
population growth rates increased. The only exceptions were a few small populations 
whose cultures had been profoundly changed by long or intensive colonisation. Most 
were found in the West Indies. In Asia, fertility had fallen modestly in Sri Lanka but 
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decline had begun in the polyglot city populations of Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Elsewhere, it did indeed look as if the Asian Family was different and gave sufficient 
support to those of its members who were newly married or had dependent  children to  
counter any other influences towards fertility control. 
Then, in the second  half of the 1960s, fertility began to fall widely throughout 
the Third World, in most of Latin America and in significant parts of Asia. By this time 
it was clear that marital fertility was also declining in Sri Lanka, and elsewhere that the 
same thing was happening not only in Singapore and Hong Kong but also in South 
Korea, Taiwan, the  Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Fertility decline also began in 
two of what are now new Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It 
appears to have begun even earlier in Krygyzstan and Kazakstan, but this may have 
been largely confined to their considerable  European populations. The social research 
problem now became that  of explaining why societies not characterised by nuclear 
families, and often strongly patrilineal and patriarchal, could experience fertility 
transition. 
Since then, fertility transition in ESCAP Asia has become general. The only 
countries where the total fertility rate is still over five and where there is no pronounced 
downward trend in fertility are Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, Nepal and Pakistan. In 
the Middle East, this situation is still found in about half the countries, namely 
Palestine, Yemen, Oman, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Except for Libya, this 
situation is no longer true in the other large Arab area, the Maghreb, where total fertility 
rates range from 3.4 to 4.4. 
What happened? In terms of the economic and social thresholds exhibited in the 
West at the onset of fertility decline, Latin America’s fertility transition was to be 
expected. It had become richer, more industrialised and more urbanised. But, except in 
Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Brunei, this was not the case in Asia. Real per capita 
income was much lower than it had been in the West, and so was the proportion of non-
agricultural population and the level of urbanisation. Only two indices compared with 
the West at the onset of fertility transition: child survival and, more generally, mortality 
levels in East and Southeast Asia, and schooling levels in those two regions. It may, of 
course, be that child survival and the effect of education, in increasing both  the costs of 
children and the aspirations of parents, are the two key elements in fertility transition. 
There is a growing body of research that points this way. 
But Asia was unusual, too, when its transition was compared with populations 
elsewhere that had retained high fertility. A comparison of a range of sub-Saharan 
African countries and Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s showed that the former 
would be at least as likely to exhibit early fertility decline if that decline were to be 
solely determined by  economic and health levels [Caldwell and Caldwell (1988)]. In 
most of these African countries fertility remained high, at least until very recently. 
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The unique element in the surprisingly early Asian fertility decline is 
undoubtedly the Asian-style national family planning programme. These programmes 
were invented in Asia, and ESCAP Asia
1 is still very largely their preserve. Where they 
have existed at all elsewhere, they have only been pallid and much less effective 
instruments as in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Southwest Asia. The nearest 
parallel to the Asian  experience is in North Africa. 
Elsewhere, I have attempted to analyse the success of the Asian programmes in a 
great arc of countries stretching from India through Southeast Asia and then northward 
to China and South Korea. The key to their success appeared to be their leadership by 
elites convinced of the need to set up family planning programmes, and providing 
leadership in moral terms and not as if they were merely providing a new range of 
optional services. These elites picked up the message from the West but it resonated 
with  older feelings about large population numbers and limited resources, and  some 
probably saw the growth of large poverty-stricken populations as a threat. The most 
important aspect of this movement was an old tradition of the nation state and an old 
tradition of elites providing leadership not merely in political but also in moral terms. 
The basis for this is obvious in Confucian and Hindu populations and to a lesser degree 
in Buddhist ones. But these attitudes were also approximated by both independence 
movements and army regimes. In Indonesian successive colonial  and independence 
regimes have fashioned a relationship between the central government and village 
authorities which achieves the same end. 
This moral leadership succeeded only where there was no strong competition for 
moral leadership, especially one that had views on fertility control. In Europe and South 
America the Christian church, especially its Catholic variant, had largely prevented 
governments from entering this field except to oppose fertility control. In sub-Saharan 
Africa traditional religion was not organised, but the fact that its central tenet was 
pronatalism made elites and governments wary of supporting family planning 
programmes too strongly. In Asia, in contrast, historically not only fertility control but 
infanticide had been acceptable in Japan, China and significant parts of India. Islam had 
no specific tenets opposing contraception, but it could be argued that it was opposed to 
undue pessimism about the future. 
In these circumstances, there was little debate among the elites about erecting 
national family planning programmes. There was merely a need to convince the mass of 
the people, and this they were willing to do. Indeed, having a moral target meant that a 
degree of compulsion was not  ruled out. That compulsion came in China from the 
1i.e., the Asian Countries belonging to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific. This region excludes the Middle East and Siberian Russia, but includes all Asian countries 
from Iran eastward (including the new Central Asian countries previously part of the USSR). The full ESCAP 
region also covers Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, but this area is excluded from the region 
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1970s; in India during the 1975–77 Emergency and to some degree at earlier times; and, 
arguably, to some extent in  Indonesia. These programmes proved  beyond doubt that 
coercion can reduce fertility almost indefinitely and that it is not necessary to  wait for 
sufficient socio-economic change. 
Where there was moral opposition, the situation was more complex. The attitude 
of the Catholic church in the Philippines stalled the success of  the programme there. A 
changed moral and political philosophy in Malaysia brought the Malay fertility decline 
to a halt. When we were carrying out research in rural South India, village Muslim 
leaders argued in opposition to the family planning programme that Hindus had always 
worshipped governments while Muslims had a holy book for guidance [Caldwell et al. 
(1988)]. Muslim acceptance of the programme was weaker and their fertility was 
higher, but it should be noted that this may have been more the reaction of a minority 
population than a basically religious position. Indeed, the village Muslim religious 
leadership found it difficult to define exactly what the religious case against family 
planning was, and many of their followers did accept voluntary sterilisation. 
We and colleagues have studied two Asian experiences of very contrasting types. 
The first was in Sri Lanka which is the closest Third World Asian approach to 
the Western experience. Sri Lanka is a poor country by world and South Asian 
standards. It has one-fortieth of the per capita income of the United States, but a life 
expectancy only three years shorter and a fertility level which characterised America 
until the end of the 1960s. The explanation is to be found in its high educational levels, 
particularly important in the case of women, and in low child mortality levels, a product 
both of maternal education and an easily accessible health system. The underlying 
reason for this situation is an ancient fairly high status of women, the Buddhist belief in 
enlightenment, the nineteenth century Buddhist Reform Movement which translated 
this into a need for education, and an egalitarian radical tradition which demanded equal 
benefits for rural and poor urban populations. The educational situation of women in Sri 
Lanka’s 1921 Census was similar to that of Pakistani women in Pakistan’s 1981 
Census. As early as the 1930s, there was some control of fertility in Sri Lanka by the 
so-called natural methods (abstinence, withdrawal and rhythm), and Sri Lankans used 
these methods so easily that until recently they have explained nearly half of all fertility 
control. 
More recently, we have been part of a group examining one of the world’s least 
likely fertility transitions, that of Bangladesh. Bangladesh has only 70 percent of the per 
capita income of India and little more than half that of Pakistan. Its level of urbanisation 
is around half the Pakistan level. Furthermore, its existence as a nation state dates back 
not millennia but only 26 years, although Bengali cultural nationalism provides 
something of a substitute. Elite leadership has been confused by a rapid rotation of 
governments, and the population is very largely Muslim. Yet, the most recent John C. Caldwell  390
Demographic and Health Survey shows a total fertility rate of 3.6, close to that of India 
and only just  above the Southeast Asian average. Fertility has declined by 50 percent 
over the last two decades, and this has been achieved by contraception, with nearly half 
of all married couples practising fertility control. This achievement is widely regarded 
as the mere application of an efficient family planning programme in forbidding social 
and economic circumstances. [Carty et al. (1994).] 
Our study suggested that the situation has been more complex than this and that 
it is not a simple situation of the government of the day deciding to adopt an efficient 
family planning programme. Bangladesh’s experience has  quite deep historical roots. 
These go back to undivided India, with the ICS  officers apprehensive of fast population 
growth and famine, and to undivided Pakistan with the first family planning programme 
starting in the second half of the 1950s [Adil (1966)]. This programme is now regarded 
as having largely been a failure, yet the officers who organised Ayub Khan’s 
programme in the 1960s report that they built on trained groups surviving from the 
earlier programme. More importantly, civil servants from the 1950s assumed family 
planning to be the policy of the land and were trained to think so in the Civil Service 
College in Lahore; East Pakistani officers had this reinforced by a further period at the 
Comilla College for Rural Development. The lessons were particularly pertinent in East 
Pakistan because of the obvious density of the population and they were reinforced by 
the crises brought about by war and floods. In the 1960s the Ayub Khan programme 
appears to have been more effective in East than West Pakistan. Certainly, it created a 
cadre of civil servants who believed in the policy and carried it through into the period 
of the new Bangladesh state. 
The first period of this new state was one of disorganisation and euphoria, where 
such cautious programmes as family planning were not a high priority and where 
politics was all. This period passed for several reasons. The new civil service was in fact 
the old civil service and provided the strongest element of stability. The new state was 
soon beset by problems and its obviously dense population was easily seen as an 
aggravating factor. The poverty of the world’s largest new country both attracted 
unusual quantities of international aid and made governments reluctant to reject the aid 
and the advice that went with it. 
There has been a consensus within the civil service, the elite, the army and the 
government, at least since about 1973, that family planning is a national priority, an 
attitude that it is above politics. Nearly all educated Bangladeshis now take that view. 
There has been no religious opposition at the national level. This is partly explained by 
the fact that the religious leadership took the wrong side in the War of Independence, 
backing religious cohesion against cultural cohesion. Every survey shows the chief rural 
resistance to the acceptance of contraception is religious but deeper questioning of what 
this means suggests that the opposing force is less theological than conservative. Older 
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rural society, and especially on the rights of men over women, and the old over the 
young. Superficially, politics seems to have been very divisive in Bangladesh, but 
governments and oppositions are separated by no vast ideological gulfs and there is 
increasing ethnic and cultural homogeneity in the country. The civil service is 
surprisingly little affected by political changes and there is a consistency in their 
development priorities and policies. 
Economic change has been limited but social change less so. The War of 
Independence and subsequent politicisation brought national politics into the village 
and did much to break down rural isolation. There has been a transport revolution with 
large trucks on the main roads and bicycle rickshaws using the new paths to bring 
wheeled transport even into the remotest villages. Bangladesh doubled the proportion of 
its girls in school between 1980 and 1993 and is approaching universal primary 
schooling for both boys and girls. Girls’ schooling at both the primary and secondary  
level is now twice the level found in Pakistan [World Bank (1996)]. The new textile 
industries in Dhaka have a very largely female work force. 
Finally, the family planning programme is well developed, does not charge, and 
provides a wide range of contraception. It is almost certain that, if Bangladesh had 
followed the Indian example and provided little but sterilisation, its fertility would not 
be nearly as low as India’s. In fact, only a quarter of Bangladesh’s family planners are 
protected by sterilisation compared with almost three-quarters in India. The Matlab 
experimental area in Bangladesh has shown that new additions to those practising 
contraception are achieved mostly by making new methods available. [Caldwell and 
Caldwell (1992)] There is not as much substitution as might have been anticipated. The 
very high level of family planning now achieved in the Matlab intervention area has 
been attained by offering injectables, now used by over half the contraceptors there, and 
by growing numbers  in the rest of the country. 
The great anomaly in ESCAP Asia’s family planning picture is, of course, 
Pakistan, with a total fertility rate which may still be close to six, and a contraceptive 
prevalence rate among married couples of 12 percent by all methods and nine percent 
by modern methods. Pakistan has a much higher per capita income than the few other 
ESCAP countries with nearly uncontrolled fertility: Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos 
and Cambodia. 
I have come here to learn the reasons for this situation rather than to ascribe 
them. I seek to have my wilder surmises corrected. 
It does appear to the outsider that there have been other political priorities. There 
are real ethnic tensions of a kind  that do not exist in Bangladesh. Changes of 
Government really do impinge on civil servants and their priorities. There appears to be 
an unresolved struggle between the more theological and the more secular state of a 
kind that does not exist in Bangladesh in spite of the fact that one political party might 
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of greater concern to Pakistan, though they do not seem to give rise to political schisms. 
In social and economic terms, the obvious index is the low level of female 
education in Pakistan. This may be a sign of strong male dominance and patriarchy but 
it may also be a factor reinforcing that situation. 
I am less certain about religious issues. Pakistan is close to the Middle East and 
may share some of the feeling that family size is not a matter for people on this earth to 
determine. Nevertheless, it is salutary to realise that not only North Africa but 
considerable parts of the Middle East have contraceptive levels far in excess of 
Pakistan’s. Syria’s level is almost twice as high, Jordan’s three times as high and 
Bahrain’s more than four times, while Iran, with a prevalence rate of 65 percent, 
competes with Sri Lanka and Thailand. 
The fertility revolution in Asia is truly astonishing. In the ESCAP region around 
45 percent of the population is under or around long-term replacement. The problems of 
supporting the aged and other issues once experienced only by industrialised economies 
are now facing much of Asia. At the same time, most of the region is finding it easier to 
provide sustained education for the relatively small proportion of children they now 
have. In contrast, Pakistan is the largest Muslim country, and indeed the largest country 
of any faith in the world, without controlled fertility. There must be sufficient reasons, 
and I am eager to learn them. 
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It is an outstanding pleasure to welcome Professor Caldwell to the PSDE 
Conference: we have been trying to invite him for the last several years; I am so glad 
he could make it given his very busy schedule as the IUSSP President. It is also an 
honour to be a discussant on his paper, A New Look at the Fertility Transition in 
Asia. No one has written more extensively and prolifically on demographic 
transitions in the Third World, especially the Asian region, as him and this paper is a 
result of several years of experience, research and travel. I feel I can hardly match the 
profundity of his lecture and I warn you that my comments on his paper will seem 
very pedestrian in contrast. 
Professor Caldwell has highlighted the immense role that the fertility 
transition in Asia has played in bringing about a stationary population in the world, 
of preventing the largest proportion (80 percent) of the world’s births between 1965 
and 1988. This is of course because most of the world’s most populous nations are 
Asian: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is worth remembering 
that despite falls in fertility in most of Asia, due to population momentum and the 
large sizes of the population, Asia will continue to be the region which will 
contribute most to the world’s population even up to the middle of the next Century. 
The second point which is worth highlighting and very central to the theme of the 
lecture is that the fertility transition in Asia has been far from uniform, phased over 
20 years and is not over in many parts of Asia. 
The fertility transition in East Asia began as far back as the 1960s, followed 
by most of East Asia in the 1970s and South Asian countries beginning their fertility 
decline in the eighties and most of West Asia will probably experience their 
transition in the 1990s. The onset of fertility transition and its speed has been 
different across sub-regions of Asia, reflecting their distinctly different economic 
growth, linguistic and ethnic compositions, and cultures. So right from the beginning 
it should be said that it is extremely difficult to generalise at all about the Asian 
Fertility transition. In a IUSSP Seminar in 1989, many scholars met to discuss the 
transition in Asia, and the vastly different experience of each sub-region, leave alone 
regions within large countries like China and India, were a challenge to explain. 
There were very few commonalities about the fertility transition in most Asian 
Countries. I think this is also the conclusion of Professor Caldwell’s lecture. 
Professor Caldwell has tried to bring out some of the specificities of the Asian 
fertility transition, particularly those that might differentiate it from the European 
transition which preceded several decades earlier. I would like to add to his list, 
perhaps it would be correct to say that I would be just amplifying some of the points 
made fleetingly in his paper: Comments  395 
  1. Family systems are much more integral part of Asian way of life than most of 
Europe. Relations between the generations (particularly parents and sons) 
and gender relations which contribute to very strong preference which 
continues to exist even in parts of Asia (Korea, Taiwan and China) where 
fertility has declined cannot be emphasised enough. 
  2.  Women’s status is consequently lower in Asia than in Europe. 
  3. Mortality levels in Asia are much lower than they were in Europe at the onset 
of their transition.....also we are talking in Asia about much higher fertility 
levels and large population sizes, much exceeding those found in Europe. 
  4. The most glaring difference (in my opinion) is that while during the 
European transition there were no means to control fertility except traditional 
ones like withdrawal, rhythm and abortion, most of Asia is inundated with 
modern contraceptive methods. The development of modern contraceptives 
like the oral pill, the IUD and the injectable preceded the Asian fertility 
transition, and all countries in varying degrees did have theoretical access to 
these contraceptives. 
  5. Furthermore, most Asian countries unlike European ones, were actively 
involved at the level of the State in promoting contraception and in reducing 
fertility. The level of state authority is also greater than in Europe except in 
Eastern Europe. The main thrust of my comments are based on this 
difference: how important is this difference when we reflect upon the 
Fertility transition in Asia and compare it to the widely studied European 
transition. 
 
The Role of State Policies 
Professor Caldwell explicitly ascribes huge importance to the role of policies 
in bringing about changes in fertility behaviour. Most of the discussion in his paper 
surrounds differences in policies pursued by various Governments in Asia and their 
relative successes and failures. Personally I would like to pose the question of 
whether policies in Asia have been all that successful and congruously whether 
change (excepting in the case of China) would not have occurred all the same even if 
the “growing movement which wanted to hasten the fertility transition” had not been 
in motion! 
Ultimately fertility fell in Asia, perhaps when per capita incomes were overall 
lower than they were in Europe at the onset of transition, and perhaps with lower 
levels of urbanisation and industrialisation. But the general pattern of change was not 
all that different. More technologically advanced countries, those with more modern 
labour forces and with more women in the labour force, those with higher levels of 
education and with higher economic growth were the ones to lead the transition. 
How much of a role can we attribute to population policy alone in the absence of 
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Perhaps the role of policy can at most be that of a catalyst, of advancing 
transitions by a few years may be a decade at most. But there are equivalent stories of 
how policy is not uniformly successful (parts of Indonesia, even rural China) and 
Pakistan and I would go as far as to include India. As pointed out by Caldwell, Nehru 
adopted an anti-nationalist policy as far back as 1951, and despite this policy, despite 
the coercive measures of the Emergency and the sterilisation campaign by Sanjay 
Gandhi,  most of India (with the exception of Kerala and Tamil Nadu) did not 
experience a decline in fertility until about a decade ago.....more than thirty years 
after the official policy was adopted. The wide differences in fertility which exist 
across the Indian states with some like Kerala and Tamil Nadu having achieved 
almost replacement fertility and others like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar which only 
recently have shown signs of a fertility decline demonstrate my point that policy at 
that level may have had little to do with changes in behaviour. 
I am not arguing that policy has no effect at all. Instead I would like to argue 
that it is the nature of the State, its fortitude in implementing policies which 
ultimately matters. I would like to raise the example of Iran. Professor Caldwell 
points out in the paper the role of “Islamic fundamentalism” in reversing the urban 
fertility transition. But in his “new look” at the Asian Fertility transition he may find 
stronger lessons to be drawn from what is happening more currently in the Islamic 
State of Iran. Iran only adopted a firm policy of bringing down mortality and fertility 
only as late as 1992, already it has achieved huge declines in infant-child mortality 
and in fertility. I do not believe that there has been a change in the Islamic mind set 
of the government of Iran but a clear vision that lower fertility is necessary for 
survival has been pursued systematically and consistently at all levels by a strong 
state and achieving much greater success than the rather ‘unsuccessful’ experiment 
of one of Asia’s earliest programmes, India and as effective as the Draconian 
policies followed by China. Indonesia, Korea, Singapore all share the common 
characteristics of a strong state, which is not just associated with more rapid fertility 
transitions but other development and social policies. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are 
two countries singled out by Professor Caldwell in his paper in elaborating on the 
Asian fertility transition. I would like to take up these two cases and make some 
comments on the role of social, cultural and religious factors in fertility change. 
The case of Sri Lanka is unique in its high levels of female education and 
broad based and more egalitarian social and economic systems. It is also an island 
and experienced fertility decline the earliest in South Asia. Bangladesh’s success in 
achieving fertility decline in a poor setting is the development planners ‘dream 
story’: with most of the achievement being attributed to by an efficient population 
policy. I would like to argue, perhaps much more strongly than Professor Caldwell, 
that indeed there were important social changes related closely to economic changes 
which may have preceded or at least “enabled” this unusual setting to achieve rapid  Comments  397 
fertility change. Increasing landlessness leading to migration, women entering the 
informal labour force, the burgeoning of the garment industry, female headed 
households, to name a few. Poverty induced or whatever, Bangladeshi society was 
under extreme economic pressures, to which it was reacting, and the policy and 
strong family planning programme came alongside. 
I do not believe that Bangladesh’s family planning programme alone can take 
the cup away on being the winner of the fertility transition. Though designed better 
than the Indian programme because of its multiple methods (versus the rather 
excessive reliance on sterilisation in India) it has in its favour a much more 
homogenous population than India and Pakistan, much more closely spaced 
settlements etc. 
I would now like to turn to Pakistan. The biggest challenge left in Asia 
according to Professor Caldwell is Pakistan, “the largest Muslim country and indeed 
the largest country of any faith in the world without controlled fertility. First of all I 
would like to have reassured to Professor Caldwell that fertility has most certainly 
begun to decline in Pakistan. The urban fertility transition started atleast a decade ago 
and the transition in rural areas, has begun more recently in the last couple of years. 
Professor Caldwell’s figures need updation: The official figure for the total fertility 
rate adopted for the beginning of the Ninth Plan early next year is 5.4, though most 
demographers including Dr Hashmi would argue that this total fertility rate has 
already been achieved and the TFR is much lower. The contraceptive prevalence 
survey of 1994-95 found the contraceptive prevalence rate to be 18 percent 
nationally and about 11 in rural areas and 33 in urban areas. There is ample evidence 
collected by the National Institute of Population studies and the Population Council 
that there has been very rapid changes in contraceptive adoption in urban but also in 
rural areas, atleast of Punjab and NWFP. 
What is indeed quite interesting about the fertility transition in Pakistan is the 
predominance of traditional methods, particularly the use of withdrawal. This is 
reminiscent of the wide reliance on withdrawal as the main method used in the 
European fertility transition. But more importantly the fact that condoms and 
withdrawal account for more than 45 percent of contraceptive use in Pakistan, 
suggests that most of the fertility transition is occurring outside of the Population 
programme, outside of the purview of population policy. Increased aspirations for 
schooling, spiralling inflation, rapid urbanisation and migration are the major 
explanations for the reduced demand for children. But the means being adopted to 
control fertility present a telling story of a demand driven transition. Despite an 
official programme since 1965, fertility changes could not be “engineered” easily in 
Pakistan. I do not think as Caldwell suggests that religious opposition has played 
much of a role in Pakistan. Religious opposition, if any, has practically dissipated  
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with the emergence of more immediate and practical consideration of providing for 
more children. Again Pakistan is following its own unique path to achieving fertility 
transition, one quite different from to other South Asian neighbours. 
To conclude I would again like to reiterate that given the vast variations across 
Asian societies in social conditions, in levels of economic development, a single 
model or explanation for fertility decline is not possible. What Asia has proven, 
much more so than the case of Europe, that there seem to be more exceptions than 
conformity with any single theory of demographic transition. Almost each individual 
country has its own unique story about the how, when and wherefore of demographic 
transition and Professor Caldwell’s new look at reinforces that view. 
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